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Balabit SCB - privileged session control with Shell Control Box

category: solutionz · date: 2026-10-03 · updated: 2026-10-03 · author: LALA

In 2017 the management infrastructure of the organisation needed one controlled way in for everybody who administered it: the organisation's own operators and the engineers of several partner companies, connecting from their VPNs to jump servers in the management LAN and to out-of-band jump servers in remote sites. I designed and built that way in with Balabit Shell Control Box (SCB) 5 LTS: a high-availability pair of SCB T-10 appliances in site 1, one in each datacenter, later a second pair in site 2. The SCB stands between the client and the jump server, terminates SSH, SCP, SFTP and RDP on both sides, lets through only the channels a policy allows, and records every session into an audit trail that is encrypted, timestamped and signed, so that what an administrator did can be replayed later and cannot be altered.

This Solution is that work, written up from my design document of the site 1 cluster (its configuration chapter shows the settings as they were made in production), the end-user access guide, the connection summary, the network sheets, a pre-design analysis, my working notes on certificates, LDAP and the open questions, the operation and troubleshooting notes with the answers of the vendor's support, and a support bundle of the site 2 cluster that holds its exported configuration. The site 2 cluster has no design document of its own; it is described from that export and from the sheets, and where it differs from site 1 the documents say so.

noteEvery answer set, file, command set and listing is shown as it was configured or run, and then checked against what was current on 2026-10-03: the product is now One Identity Safeguard for Privileged Sessions (SPS), with 9.0 the newest release and 8.0 the current LTS. SCB 5.0 LTS was discontinued on 2020-05-28, the T-Series appliances reached end of support on 2024-07-31, and several of the as-built choices (SHA-1 key exchange, CBC ciphers and hmac-sha1 for SSH, the RDP 4/5 switches, the signing certificate's extended key usage) are discouraged or gone. The system is anonymized: host names, domains and addresses follow the same fictional plan as the NetApp and Email Solutions of the same environment, the organisation is ORG, the partner companies are PARTNER1 to PARTNER5, persons are admin01 and up, and every password, key, fingerprint and serial number is a placeholder. The documents contradict each other in places; that is reported where it was found, not corrected.

The system in one picture

mermaid
flowchart LR
  subgraph users["Users on their VPNs"]
    org["ORG operators"]
    prt["Partner engineers"]
    adm["SCB administrators"]
  end
  subgraph site1["Site 1, management LAN"]
    subgraph scb["SCB cluster dc1-s-xblb001"]
      n1["dc1-a-ablb001, datacenter A"]
      n2["dc1-b-ablb001, datacenter B"]
    end
    jmp["Jump servers SSH, RDP, SCP"]
    ad["Active Directory"]
    nas["NetApp NFS"]
    svc["DNS, NTP, mail, syslog, Sensu"]
  end
  oob["Out-of-band jump servers, sites 1 to 5, over IPv6"]
  org -- "SSH, RDP, SCP to 10.11.16.65" --> scb
  prt -- "SSH, RDP, SCP to 10.11.16.65" --> scb
  adm -- "HTTPS, SSH to 10.11.16.81" --> scb
  n1 -- "DRBD and heartbeat" --- n2
  scb -- "recorded sessions" --> jmp
  scb -- "recorded sessions" --> oob
  scb -- "LDAPS" --> ad
  scb -- "backups and archives" --> nas
  scb --> svc

The fictional environment

Every Article and every Config document uses the same names and addresses.

ThingValue
Site 1 clusterdc1-s-xblb001.adm.example.net (also dc1-s-xblm001 in older documents and the certificates); nodes dc1-a-ablb001 (datacenter A) and dc1-b-ablb001 (datacenter B), SCB T-10, SCB 5 LTS (5.0.3 in the design)
In-band managementVLAN 1010, 10.11.16.80/29, cluster address 10.11.16.81 (web interface, SSH console)
Production, user accessVLAN 1009, 10.11.16.64/29, 10.11.16.65 and 2001:db8:a1:c0e::f:1, also scb.example.net
HA linksport 4 1.2.4.1 and 1.2.4.2 (the fixed HA addresses of the cluster link, marked (FIX) on the HA page); redundant heartbeat VLAN 1018 10.11.18.208/28
Backup and archiveVLAN 1020, 10.11.18.225 to the NetApp SVM 10.11.18.236 over NFS
IPMIout-of-band network VLAN 12, 10.11.15.29 (A) and 10.11.23.29 (B)
Site 2 clusterdc2-s-xblb001.adm.example.net, 10.12.16.81, 10.12.16.65, 2001:db8:a2:c0e::f:1; 5.0.6 in September 2018
DirectoryActive Directory ad.example.net on dc1-a-vcad001 and dc1-a-vcad002, bind account scb_svc
Usersthe organisation (ORG) and partners 1 to 5 (PARTNER1 … PARTNER5, and CLOUD_PARTNER1 for a cloud team of partner 1), each with its own groups, connections, ports, backups and archives

The address plan is the one of the NetApp and Email Solutions; the NetApp Solution describes the storage end of the SCB's backups. The other private ranges of the original plan are 10.19.x, public addresses come from 198.51.100.0/24, and the remote sites' IPv6 ranges are in 2001:db8::/32.

Articles

Read in this order.

#ArticleWhat it covers
1Requirements and conceptWhat the SCB is and why it was bought, the requirements and constraints, the questions of the pre-design analysis, the users and their roles, the conceptual design
2Logical design and integrationsActive Directory, NAS, DNS and NTP, mail, syslog, Sensu, the CA question, jump servers in the management LAN and out of band, the communication matrix
3Modes of operation and connectionsNon-transparent mode, inband destination selection, IPv6 for user connections, one port per partner and protocol, how the policies hang together
4Hardware, cabling and networksThe T-10, its ports, the cabling found and the cabling recommended, switch ports, VLANs, interfaces, routes, DNS names, an earlier variant with NAT-ed networks, site 2
5High availabilityMaster and slave, DRBD, the redundant heartbeat, next-hop monitoring, the state of the site 2 pair, a slave out of time sync
6IPMI out-of-band managementThe IPMI modules of both nodes, ipmitool, the out-of-band flows, their certificates and logins
7Basic settings, logging and monitoringLocal services, syslog, mail, SNMPv3 for Sensu, alerts, date and time, version and licence, the appliance's own syslog-ng
8Active Directory and access controlService account, nested authorization and role groups, AAA, local admin and root, the LDAP server policy, the ldapsearch tests
9Certificates and keysWhy the SCB has its own CA, the server and TSA certificates, every CSR round, the organisation-CA certificates, the XCA keys for audit trails, the GPG backup key
10Audit trails: encryption and replayThe audit policy, per-auditor encryption certificates, finding and downloading a trail, decrypting and verifying it in the Desktop Player
11Backup, archive and retentionThe encrypted configuration backup, per-partner backups and archives to NFS, retention and cleanup, the change from CIFS to NFS
12Connection and channel policiesThe RDP and SSH connections, channel and authentication policies, SSH and RDP settings, the WinSCP content policy, site 1 against site 2
13End-user accessWhat a user needs and types in MSTSC, PuTTY, OpenSSH and WinSCP, partner by partner and site by site
14Operations, upgrades and troubleshootingConsole and firmware, support bundles, the upgrade from 4 to 5, tainted firmware, the clock, the upgrade history of site 2, the open ends

Configuration

Each document holds one answer set, one file, one command set or one listing as it was configured or used, with comments and a check against the current release. The appliance is configured in its web interface, so most documents are answer sets: one line Page / Field = value per setting, transcribed from the configuration chapter of the design document. The site 2 documents are elements of its exported config.xml.

Design and connections

Network and hardware

High availability and IPMI

Basic settings, logging and monitoring

Active Directory and access control

Certificates and keys

Audit, backup and archive

Connection and channel policies

End-user access and operations

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